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butter, namely defense versus social sector expenditure. The aim of this research is identifying 
whether indeed defense spending crowded out investment and other social expenditures as 
health and education. Previous research does not yield strong and unambiguous evidence of 
neither positive nor negative effects of military expenditure on social spending.  It is striking 
that the guns versus butter dilemma has not been extensively studied for Spain. Using Mintz and 
Huang (1991) strategy applied to the US, we test if the government expenditure in defense in 
Spain during the last part of the Franco’s dictatorship and the first years of the transition and 
democracy, contributed positively or negatively to education spending. Results show a negative 
trade-off for the Franco’s regimen and an ambiguous effect for the last part of the sample.  
Keywords: Guns versus butter dilemma, military spending, economic growth and social 
expenditures, education spending, Spain from 1950 to 2000 
JEL codes: H51, H52, H53, H56, N40, N44 
                                                            
1 This author acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain through the 
research project ECO2012-31941. 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
The relationship between military and welfare efforts by states and its economic and 
social effects during the twentieth century has often been examined in the past five 
decades. One of the most relevant approaches to study it has been the guns versus butter 
hypothesis, which is generally used as a simplification of national spending as a part of 
GDP. This theory is the classic example of the production possibility frontier and 
models the relationship between the spending of a country in military and civilian 
goods. Nations cannot have everything they want, being limited by the resources and 
the technology available to them. They are always being compelled to choose between 
two options when spending their finite resources. They will have to decide what level of 
defense and civilian goods best fulfills their needs. They can buy either guns or butter, 
or a mix of both, every choice having an opportunity cost: they can get more of 
something only by giving up something else (Samuelson, 1948).  
The existence or not of a trade-off relationship between military outlays and 
welfare spending and its economic and social effects have received substantial coverage 
in the academic literature, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Most of them focused 
on the short-term or direct impact of defense outlays on welfare expenditures. Others 
have usually assumed that this impact is indirect or long-term in nature. In spite of the 
diversity of approaches, theories, methodologies, and data sets used, the literature 
indicates that the results are inconsistent and that we do not yet know whether guns 
come at the expense of butter. The results of research on the guns versus butter dilemma 
have depended on the formulation of the hypotheses, the budgetary trade-off categories 
taken into account, the influential factors on resource allocation considered, the 
specification, estimation techniques and methodologies utild, the design of cross-
sectional or longitudinal approach, the solution to statistical problems such as 
multicolinearity and autocorrelation, the effects considered (aggregated or 
disaggregated), and last but not least the period examined (wartime or peacetime) and 
the use of actual, final or partial budgetary data (Berry and Lowery, 1990; Huang and 
Mintz,1992; Jurado-Sánchez,2012). 
The guns-butter trade-off is a remarkable topic in Public Economics, Defense 
Economics and Political Science which has been analyzed for about thirty countries. 
The majority of them are European countries, 16 being currently members of the 
European Union (see Appendix 1), which represent the geopolitical environment of 
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Spain. In addition, most of the previous studies analyze the second half of the 20th 
century, a period in which Spain was accelerating its economic and political 
convergence with Europe. According to statistics published by Eurostat, between 1960 
and 2000, the annual average rate of growth of Spanish GDP was close to 4.5 per cent, 
one percentage point more than that of the EU-15, the Spanish GDP per capita reaching 
81 per cent of UE-15 figure in the 1990s.These are good reasons why this article must 
be written, but there exist several more. In the first place, as far as we know, the gun 
versus butter theory has not yet been investigated for Spain. Secondly, this research will 
enable us to discover the Spanish case and to compare it with the most important 
Western nations, that is to say, to establish whether Spain was different in spending its 
resources on military and civilian goods. In addition, the interest of this study increases 
due to the guns versus butter dilemma is an issue which is closely connected to Public 
Finances, which nowadays present large shortfalls in Spain and many other Western 
countries. Lastly, the literature of the guns versus butter theory shows that it is 
necessary to choose in order to finance the diverse public goods or services, this 
decision having important economic and social effects. For example, the provision of 
welfare programs implies a lot of public spending with important economic effects, but 
social expenditures can be a counterbalancing factor which compensates for the effects 
of poverty and inequality and therefore reduces the probability of social unrest.  
There are in the literature several diverse and suggestive empirical models to 
study the existence or non-existence of budgetary trade-offs between defense and 
welfare expenditures. Bearing in mind the theoretical and methodological basis and 
other factors, we have used probably the most appealing of them for researching topics 
of Public Economics, Defense Economics and even Economic History. We are referring 
to the indirect effect model applied by Mintz and Huang (1991) to the US case from 
1953 to 1987.For these authors, increased defense outlays crowd out investment, which, 
in turn, dampens economic growth, thereby reducing the ability of governments to 
allocate more funds to welfare programs. Applying the indirect effect model, we intend 
to discover if during the 1950-2000 period the Spanish government expenditure on 
defense had a positive or negative effect on education spending.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a brief overview 
of the literature on the guns vs. butter dilemma is presented. Section 3 describes briefly 
the empirical model used in the paper.  Section 4 introduces variables and data. Section 
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5 presents the main results and Section 6 gives some concluding comments and 
proposes issues for future research. 
 
II. Guns versus butter theory: an overview of the literature  
 
Early studies of the guns versus butter dilemma, made at the end of the 1960s and in the 
first half of the 1970s, report the existence of a trade-off between guns and butter 
asserting that spending on defense comes at the expense of the welfare expenditures. 
The time-series analysis of Pryor (1968) for the 1950-1962 period revealed that in those 
countries (Canada, Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and the 
United States) where military spending is a relatively large percentage of the public 
budget and the GDP, there were statistically relevant trade-offs between defense and 
public expenditures when transfer payments are excluded. Russet (1969, 1970) found 
that defense spending diverts resources available for private consumption and 
investment and several public expenditures in the United States (1939-1968), Canada, 
France and the United Kingdom (1947-1965). According to him, increases in defense 
spending led to decreases in personal consumption expenditures, fixed investment 
spending and in state and local USA governments’ welfare, education and health 
spending.  
Nevertheless, for Hollenhorst and Ault (1971) the impact of US military 
expenditures on economy and welfare spending varied substantially between the various 
sub-periods of war and peace contained in the 1939-68 period. These scholars believe 
that during the greater wars probably all society contributed to finance defense, while in 
the lesser wars it was the consumer who paid nearly the whole bill for military 
spending. Szymansky (1973) also found a negative relationship between defense 
spending and rates of growth of GNP and, with some important exceptions, 
unemployment in 18 industrialised countries during the 1950s and the 1960s, especially 
in those with the highest military expenditure/GNP ratios. According to Hartman 
(1973), the evidence suggests that defense spending in the twentieth-century United 
States had an inverse relationship to the general consumer’s standard of living, 
corporate profit, balance of payments, investment and state and local government 
expenditures in health, education and welfare. Wilensky (1975) studied sixteen 
industrialised nations and showed that those countries with very high defense spending, 
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military and welfare were mutually exclusive goals, especially during the Cold War 
period. Peroff (1976) focused her analysis on tradeoffs between defense programs and 
three domestic public policies and found that the welfare program most undermined by 
military spending was public aid, following by the health expenditures in all levels of 
government and housing. Smith (1977) asserted that between 1960 and 1970 in 15 
advanced capitalist economies high military spending is associated with much lower 
investment, lower rates of economic and productivity growth and higher rates of 
unemployment. For Smith (1980) military spending had a clear negative effect on 
investment in the 14 largest OECD countries during the 1954-1973 period, this result 
being the main opportunity cost of defense. 
From the middle of the 1970s onwards, most of the scholarly literature published 
found no evidence for guns versus butter trade-offs. The research of Caputo (1975) 
compared expenditure decisions in Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States in defense, health and education from 1950 a 1970. This author concluded 
that increased defense spending does not lead to a decrease in health expenditures and 
that there was a trade-off between military and education and expenditures, but it was 
not statistically significant. Clayton (1976) affirmed that in the United States from 1900 
to 1975 there has not been a significant correlation between defense and social spending 
since the Korean conflict, but large wars did have a notable negative impact on welfare 
spending. Peroff and Podolak-Warren (1979) found that in the United States from 1929 
to 1974 the evidence points to no trade-off between federal health and defense in 
allocations or final expenditures during war or peace, although a tradeoff existed 
between the private health sector and defense only in terms of capital investment in 
health. For Russet (1982) in the United States from 1941 through 1979 defense 
spending tended most often to move in the same direction as health or education 
expenditures, these three budgetary items increasing simultaneously during the greater 
part of the examined period. Domke, Eichenberg and Kelleher (1983) examined 
spending patterns from 1948 to 1978 in the United States, United Kingdom, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and France. They showed the absence of systematic 
defense/welfare trade-offs for most of the period since World War II, and asserted that 
military outlays and spending on welfare are unrelated. In the words of Mintz (1989), 
previous research on guns vs. butter tradeoffs have focused on total military spending 
and specific kinds of welfare expenditures (education, health, housing…). He expanded 
6 
 
the analysis to include the major subcomponents of the USA defense budget, i.e., 
military personnel, military procurement, operation and maintenance and research and 
development. The results of the disaggregated analysis by Mintz have likewise shown a 
lack of defense-welfare trade-offs, except in the Reagan era.  
Berry and Lowery (1990) criticised existing investigation on budgetary trade-
offs on several theoretical and methodological grounds, describing ‘the empirical 
results… as mixed’ (p.693). But they also found only limited empirical support for the 
domestic–defense trade-off (i.e. guns versus butter trade-off) in the United States from 
1949 through 1983. Mintz and Huang (1991) believe that one reason why investigations 
of the guns vs. butter dilemma seem to be partially supported in the empirical literature 
may be because only the direct budgetary trade-off between defense and welfare 
expenditures have been examined, usually assuming that the relationship between both 
kinds of outlays is zero-sum and, therefore, the direct effect of the former on the latter is 
expected to be negative. It is possible, however, these scholars assert, that military 
expenditure may have an indirect, negative effect on social spending, given that 
increased defense outlays crowd out investment, which, in turn, reduces economic 
growth, thereby diminishing the capacity of governments to allocate more funds to 
welfare programs. This indirect tradeoff, Mintz and Huang conclude, existed in the US 
during the 1953-1987 period, needed about six years to take place and reduced the 
education spending made by federal governments. Mok and Duval (1992) studied the 
expenditures on defense and welfare in the United States from 1954 to 1986. They 
found fairly strong evidence for the existence of certain trade-offs between defense and 
several civil programs (income security, energy, agriculture…), but other fail to produce 
a significant negative relationship (education and social security), while health and 
Medicare in fact produce a significant positive relationship with defense spending. 
Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) suggest that in Turkey from 1924 to 1996 there were trade-
offs between military and welfare spending, being negative between defense and health 
and positive between defense and education. These results support the idea that 
increased military expenditures reduce the resources available for health, but also 
suggest that defense does not crowd out education. Gifford (2006) believes that the 
inconsistent findings of empirical research on the guns vs. butter dilemma are due to the 
standard measure of military efforts utilised –military outlays- not being good enough to 
capture the whole impact of defense. For this reason, he analyses both defense spending 
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and military personnel as a more wide-ranging measure of a state’s defense in a study of 
16 developed and industrialised nations from 1960 to 1993. Gifford concludes that 
countries with large armed forces relative to their populations make smaller social 
welfare efforts, while nations with conscription tend to spend more on social programs.  
 
III. Direct, indirect effect or both: Mintz and Huang model 
The academic literature put at our disposal many different approaches, models and 
methods to study the relationships between defense outlays and welfare spending in 
Spain. Some of them are quite revealing, notably those of Russet (1982), Domke, 
Eichenberg and Kelleher (1983), Barry and Lowery (1990), Mok and Duval (1992), and 
Gifford (2006). Nevertheless, taking into account the theoretical and methodological 
fundamentals, the data availability for Spain and other factors, it seems that one of the 
most appealing to carry out a research on a topic of Public Economics, Defense 
Economics and even Economic History is the indirect effect model by Mintz and Huang 
(1991).These authors hypothesise, firstly, that when military expenditures increase, 
investment is reduced. This trade-off is due to military spending and investment 
competing for the non-consumption part of the total productive capacity of the economy 
and to private and non-military public consumption accounting for more than half of the 
total output of the economy with both being highly resistant to reductions. In addition, 
increased levels of defense outlays may also entail higher taxes or government 
borrowing, funds that otherwise might have gone to investment. Secondly, they expect, 
so long as investment is a crucial element of economic growth, that military spending 
will have a negative, indirect effect on growth. Lastly, they also suppose that the link 
between economic growth and education spending is positive, given that the former 
propelled the expenditures in all government programs, including the latter. 
Mintz and Huang propose a three-equation system to analyze both direct and 
indirect effects of military exp enditure on welfare programs: on the one hand, the direct 
effect, namely the high opportunity costs of military expenditure from a socio-economic 
point of view, since scarce resources are absorbed that could otherwise have been 
utilised more effectively in education endeavor; on the other hand, they include in the 
analysis the indirect effect through the crowding-out effect of military spending on 
investment to reflect the fact that military spending may reallocate potential private and 
public expenditure away from investment, thereby reducing economic growth, and 
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consequently negatively affecting to welfare expenditure. We follow the model 
specification of Mintz and Huang (1991) to analyze the next three effects: 
i) They first specify an equation that defines investment as a function of 
several private and government spending variables, including defense 
expenditure. This model can be used for identifying the direct impact of 
military spending on investment. 
 
Mintz and Huang’s investment and defense equation comes from the flexible 
accelerator model proposed by Clark (1917) and then modified by Koyck (1954) and 
Chenery (1952) that considers gross investment, I, as a distributed lag on production, Y, 
and depreciation, approximated by a proportion of the capital stock, K. Therefore,  
 1
0
  

  t s t s t
s
I Y dK  (1) 
Where  is the difference operator. National accounting states that
t t t t tY C I G NX    , where C is consumption, NX are net exports (exports-imports), 
G is the government purchases of goods and services. Assuming that t t tG M NM  , 
where M is military spending and NM is non-military outlays and t t t tP C I NX   , 
where P is production in the private sector, then: 
 t t t tY P NM M    (2) 
We can divide each side of (1) by Y, that is, every variable is going to be a proportion of 
the GDP. Plugging (2) in (1), assuming a finite number of lags and including a random 
error, equation (1) can be written as a testable equation:  
 1 1 1 11 , , , ,1
1 0 0
          
  
         n n mI I I I I It t s t s t s tp s NM s M s k t
s s st t t t t
I P NM M K u
Y Y Y Y Y
 (3) 
 
ii) The indirect effect of military expenditure on growth is analyzed through an 
equation that allows the crowding out effect to be measured. 
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The relationship between I, M and other variables accounting for economic growth, 
comes from the Solow (1988) and Denison (1967, 1985) models that link economic 
growth to changes in the level of capital and employment. Ram (1986) extends these 
models: on the hand he introduces the government output on it, and on the other hand  
assumes a linear relationship among these variables: 
 
1 1 1 1
t t t t
t t t t
Y I L G
Y Y Y Y
  
   
      , (4) 
where L is the civilian labor force and all other definitions are as above. Taking into 
account that G = M + NM, equation (4) can be written as:  
 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 1
Y Y Y Y Y Yt t t t t
t
t t t t t
Y I L NM M u
Y Y Y Y Y
    
    
          (5) 
In equation (5) we can test both the direct and indirect effect of military expenditure 
on growth. 2Y and 5Y represent the indirect and the direct effect on growth of changes in 
military spending, respectively. 
 
iii) Finally, the direct and indirect effect of military spending on education can 
be analyzed through the education expenditure equation.  
 
Following Russet (1982), Mintz and Huang (1991) propose a linear relationship 
among changes in education expenditure  tEduY and growth  % tY  and changes in 
military spending  % tMY , government revenues (T) and school enrolment
 % tEnrol : 
          1 2 3 4 5 1% % % % %               Eduy Eduy Eduy Eduy Eduy Educyt t t t ttEduY Y MY TY Enrol u  (6)
 
Where % stands for percent change and , ,t t tEduY MY TY are the ratios of education and 
military expenditures and government revenues to GDP respectively. Equation (6) 
represents the main tool for understanding both the direct and indirect effect. On the one 
hand, if a crowding out effect is found along with a statistically significant 2 Eduy
parameter, it implies an indirect effect of military expenditure on education. On the 
other hand, if 3 Eduy is statistically significant and positive it means that military 
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spending encourages education expenditure. The total effect will be depend on the size 
of 2 Eduy and 3 Eduy . 
In short the trade-off between guns and butter would require: 
1. Negative estimate for parameters , , IM s (s=1, …, k) in equation (3), which would 
suggest the Crowding-out effect of defense expenditures 
2. Positive values of 2Y  in equation (5), showing the indirect impact of increasing 
military spending on growth through decreasing investment. 
3. Finally, both direct and indirect effect can be tested in equation (6). A statistically 
significant and positive 2 Eduy coefficient would mean that if a crowding-out effect on 
investment exists a higher military burden will reduce education spending through 
lower growth. In addition, a statistically significant and negative 3 Eduy parameter, 
capturing the direct effect, would imply that the higher the military spending the lower 
the resources available for enhancing education expenditure. 
Finding direct and indirect effects of military expenditure on education will 
involve estimating equations (3), (5) and (6), which represent a system of three linear 
regressions that can be individually estimated by OLS assuming that their disturbances 
are not correlated. Alternatively, one could think that equation errors are likely to be 
subject to correlated spillovers from economy-wide shocks. For the latter case, using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) may provide more efficient estimates by 
combining information on different equations (Zellner, 1962). 
 
 
IV. Data description  
We use annual data from 1950 to 2000 of gross private domestic investment (I), gross 
domestic product at market prices (Y), private business output (P), military (M), non-
military (NM), central and regional government education expenditure (Edu) and 
government revenues (T). All these data are measured in millions of constant 1995 
Spanish Pesetas. In addition, we have data of net value of capital stock in millions of 
constant 1990 Spanish pesetas (K), school enrolment (Enrol) and employed civilian 
labor force (L) (see Appendix 2 for a precise source description). 
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In Figure 1 the performance of the abovementioned ten variables is seen. Six of 
them show long run positive trend during the whole period studied (K, P, Y, T) or the 
most part of it (M, NM). Military expenditure drops considerably from the late 1980s 
until the mid-1990s and then stays stable, this probably being due to the fact that in a 
democratic system both the preferences of average voter and the demands for social 
spending diminish the allocation of money to defense efforts (Goldsmith, 2003; Sprout 
and Sprout, 1968). Investment and employed civilian labour force increased until the 
middle of the seventies, then stagnated or decreased till the mid-1980s, and increased 
again for the rest of the period or the greater part of it. The causes of stagnation and 
decrease of investment were probably the economic crisis of the 1970s and the political 
instability generated in Spain during the transition to democracy. As for school 
enrollment, it grew until 1987, with the exception of the first half of the 1960s and the 
first years of the 1970s, and then decreased during the 1990s. This drop might be 
explained because from 1977 onwards the birth rate fell at a faster rate than it did in any 
other country in Western Europe, putting an end to Spain's ‘baby boom’. As a result, the 
school population pressures of the 1960s and the 1970s would soon abate, giving the 
country's educational system some much-needed breathing space. Lastly, regarding 
education spending, the positive trend stopped in 1978, and then it stagnated during the 
following three years, decreased in 1982-1986 and finally experienced a vigorous 
growth from 1987 onwards with the exception of 1992-1994. Public Education 
expenditures begin to grow strongly after the implementation in 1970 of the General 
Education Law (Ley General de Educación). The negative impact that the educational 
system had on human capital formation and economic growth during the first decades of 
Franco dictatorship was only overcome step by step. In the period 1940-1960, several 
factors led to a considerable loss of human capital, which negatively affected growth. 
We are referring to the decline of duration of schooling, forced emigration of 
democratically minded intellectuals, professors and teachers, and so on. In spite of 
increasing public education expenditures from 1970 on, at the end of the Franco regime 
education spending was characterised by low public financing (Camps, 2013). Probably, 
the stagnation and reduction of education spending during the transition to democracy 
was due to the second oil crisis (1979-1982) and the cuts in public spending 
implemented in the following years to tackle it. The economic recovery from 1986 
onwards, driven by the integration of Spain in the European Economic Community, 
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made it possible for total public spending, including education expenditures, to increase 
strongly.   
Figure 2 provides four graphs of ratios. Military expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP decreases during the full period, reflecting that from 1950 onwards Spanish 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP seems to be lower than in the main 
European countries (France, Great Britain) and the US, especially in the years of the 
Cold War. Nevertheless, military spending absorbed a very significant percentage of 
total state expenditure until the 1970s, surpassing the quarter two decades earlier. The 
contrast of this result with the lower ratio of the military burden can be explained by the 
underdeveloped public sector in Spain during the dictatorship, a period in which public 
expenditure in other countries was increasing at accelerated rates. The spending of the 
Spanish state as a percentage of GDP was five points lower in the 1950s than in the 
1930s, decreasing to the level of the beginning of the twentieth century. (Herranz, 
Sabaté and Galofré-Vilà, 2011). Education expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
increased, with some fluctuations, till 1971, decreased during the following years, 
recovering in 1977 the level of 1971, only to fall again between 1979 and 1986. 
Subsequently, it showed high growth until 1991, fell for the following years and finally 
stagnated for the rest of the period studied. From the 1970s onwards, the public 
education spending as a percentage of GDP increased by a factor of 2.6. If in the 1950s 
and the 1960s it surpassed 1 per cent of GDP, in the 1980s and the 1990s it was over 3 
per cent and 4 per cent, respectively. When analyzing investment and education 
spending as a percentage of military expenditures, we observe than the I/M ratio 
describes a positive trend during the whole period except for the transition period, and 
the Edu/M ratios increased until about 1972, decreased during the last years of the 
Franco regime, grew again between 1976 and 1979, with a fresh decrease until 1986, 
and finally it experienced vigorous growth for the rest of the period.  
V. Results 
Table 1 shows the individual OLS estimates for equations (3), (5) and (6). We 
compute robust standard errors using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator. These standard errors are consistent 
estimates of the true standard deviations of the estimated coefficient, even if the errors 
are heteroskedastic and/or autocorrelated.  
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Identifying direction and size of effects in equations (3), (5) and (6) is crucial in 
this research. Bearing in mind that the scale of the variables is not the same, it makes 
rather difficult to decide which of the effects of the explanatory variable on the 
endogenous variables are most important, since the value of the regression coefficients 
depends on the choice of units to measure the variables. One option to overcome this 
limitation would be to estimate equations using ‘standardised’ variables that are ‘metric-
free’ because each standardised variable has a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. Having 
standardised the variable, the interpretation of the coefficient is a straightforward: one-
unit increase in an explanatory variable (i.e. 1 standard deviation change in such a 
variable) results, on average, in a change of tan S dardized  in the standardised endogenous 
variable. Hence, using standardised coefficients one can determine whether a one-
standard-deviation change in one independent variable produces more of a change in 
relative position than a one-standard-deviation change in another independent variable. 
Nowadays this proposed solution is much less popular than it used to be, mainly 
because the coefficients can be less intuitively meaningful. In this paper we propose a 
similar alternative based on identifying the response of the endogenous variables to one-
standard deviation shock on every independent variable rather than one unit shocks, 
following the well-known procedure for computing impulse response functions in time 
series analysis. Standard deviation is a measure that describes the probability of an 
event under a normal distribution. For instance, assuming normality, one standard 
deviation accounts for 68 percent of all the possible cases, two standard deviations 
make up 95 percent of all cases, and three standard deviations cover more than 99 
percent of all possible cases. Therefore, normalizing the change in variables to one-
standard-deviation shocks, we are assuming changes that imply approximately the same 
percentage probability of happening for all the variables. In particular, if we estimate 
the model 
 1 2 2 3 3     t t t ty x x u  (7) 
Assuming that 
2 3
,y x xs s and s  are the standard deviation of 2 3,t t ty x and x , 
respectively, we interpret the model by saying that one-standard deviation change in x2t 
results in a change in y of 
22
  xs , while one-standard deviation change in x3t results in 
a change in y of 
33
  xs  
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This strategy has two main advantages: (1) it solves the measurement unit 
problem; and (2) estimating the model using the variables as defined in equations (3), 
(5) and (6) makes interpreting the results much easier. Following previous strategy for 
identifying the effects on investment of changes in military expenditure we look at 
equation (3), the investment equation, in which every variable (endogenous and 
exogenous) appears as a proportion of GDP to avoid non-stationary behavior in the 
errors of the model. In order to account for the autocorrelation found in the residual, we 
include an order 1 autoregressive model (AR(1)) that successfully captures the 
dependence structure. The number of lags included in the equation for the change in P, 
NM and M (a choice based on their significance) were 5, 4 and 3, respectively. Military 
spending takes one year to have an impact on investment, but then the effect lasts for 
three years. In order to find out the effect on investment of private sector production, 
non-military and military expenditures, we analyze the impact of one standard deviation 
change in each of these variables rather than unit shocks. For instance, instead of tracing 
an unexpected unit increase in military expenditure with standard deviation of 0.0024 in 
the investment equation, one may follow up on a shock of 0.0024 units. The same might 
be done for the rest of the variables and equations. Of course, this is just a matter of 
rescaling the responses. In particular, after three years, we find that one standard 
deviation increase in private production (2.8 per cent) increases the I/Y ratio by 7.9 per 
cent (2.04 times the I/Y standard deviation), non-military spending decreases that ratio 
by 3.2 per cent (0.82 times the I/Y standard deviation) and finally the military spending 
change decreases the I/Y ratio by 2.1 per cent (0.55 times its standard deviation). Based 
on this illustrative example, one standard deviation shock on private consumption has a 
higher and more positive impact on investment than a one-standard deviation positive 
shock on government spending. Nonetheless, this result supports the military one-year 
delayed crowding-out effect found in Mintz and Huang (1991). 
Equation (5) has as explanatory variables the change in the employment rate of 
the civilian labor force, absolute change in military, non-military expenditure and 
investment as a proportion of GDP. In addition, we include a dummy variable (Dt) that 
takes the value 1 from 1976 to 2000 and 0 for the rest of the sample to take into account 
different behavior of the several categories of public expenditure during and after the 
period of Franco dictatorship. We find that employment of the civilian labor force, 
military expenditure growth and investment have a positive impact on the GDP growth. 
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It is noteworthy that the positive direct effect of investment on GDP growth during 
Franco regimen (20.59) is four times larger than the effect found during the Spanish 
transition (5.23), thus investment has a higher positive effect during the dictatorship 
period, than during the transition and democracy part of the sample. Probably, this was 
due to the Spanish economy having had during the Franco regime a higher growth 
potential than in the following decades because it was more backward. Surprisingly, 
non-military expenditure changes do not seem to have a statistically significant 
contemporary impact on the Spanish GDP growth.  
In order to shed light on the indirect effect of military outlays on education we 
can analyze the effect of one standard deviation change in military spending as a 
proportion of GDP (0.0024). According to equation (5), one-standard deviation positive 
shocks on military spending would have increased GDP growth by 0.57 per cent 
(237.32 times 0.0024), which is slightly lower than the effect of one-standard deviation 
positive shock on investment that would increase GDP growth by 0.78 per cent (20.59 
times 0.038) during the Franco regime and by 0.20 per cent (20.58-15.36 times 0.038) 
after Franco’s dictatorship period. Therefore, the negative effect on growth because of 
the crowding out effect of a positive shock on military expenditure was not offset by the 
short run direct positive effect on the GDP growth during Franco regime. Thus, during 
the Franco era, our findings follow Mintz and Huang’s (1991) results for the US. They 
did not find a statistically significant direct effect of military expenditure on growth, 
therefore the negative relationship between military expenditure and growth is a result 
of its crowding effect on investment. Indeed, we also found a positive effect of military 
spending in growth, although it does not offset the crowding out impact of investment. 
Nonetheless, during the Spanish transition to democracy, results support the ‘Benoit 
hypothesis’, which found a positive relationship between GDP growth and military 
expenditure in 44 less-developed countries, including Spain, a developing nation during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Having shown that the crowding out effect of military spending reduced the 
GDP growth during the Franco regime, equation (6) allows us to analyze whether it also 
had a negative effect on education expenditure. Table 1 shows a positive two year 
delayed effect of the GDP growth on education expenditure. Based on previous analysis 
of equations (3) and (5) estimates, during the first part of the sample military spending 
would have a negative two-year delayed indirect effect on education. We do not find 
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any contemporary direct effect. Nevertheless, following Mintz and Huang’s worries 
about negative delayed impact of military spending on education, we introduce one lag 
of military spending changes in our regression. Military spending turned out to have a 
slight one-year direct delayed negative effect on education expenditure. In short, during 
the Franco regime, both the direct and indirect effect of military outlays contributed to 
reduce education expenditure. Finding the final effect of military expenditure in the 
second part of the sample is challenging due to the fact that we do not find negative 
consequences on growth of increasing military expenditure. Deeper analysis on the 
equation (6) estimation allows us to conclude that one standard deviation change in 
growth (3.2 per cent) has a positive impact on education expenditure change of 3.3 per 
cent (1.02 times 3.2 per cent), while one standard deviation change in military 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP (7.8 per cent) reduces education expenditure by 2.1 
per cent (0.27 times 7.8 per cent). These results highlight the negative consequences of 
military spending, in particular during Franco dictatorship and support the guns versus 
butter trade-off. We found both, a one- year delayed direct and a three-year delayed 
indirect effect. Finally, increasing enrolment has a positive influence on education 
expenditure. Government revenues seem to have no positive influence on education 
expenditure. 
To test the robustness of the OLS estimator we will estimate the three equations 
using the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) estimator, including the same 
variables as for the individually estimated equations. Table 3 shows the error correlation 
matrix of the three equations estimated in Table 2. Errors in equations (3) and (5) might 
be negatively correlated, low correlation appearing between the rest of the equation 
errors. A cross correlogram among errors does not show any statistically significant 
relationship. Table 4 shows the SUR estimate for the three equations.  Some slight 
differences are found in equation (3). Changes in non-military expenditure only have an 
effect on the I/Y ratio with a three year delay. The rest of the effects in equations (5) 
and (6) seem to be similar. 
To summarise we can conclude that: 
1. Military and non-military expenditure produced a crowding out effect on private 
investment that turned out to reduce economic growth especially during the Franco’s 
dictatorship period. Nevertheless, military spending appears to have a moderately 
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positive impact on economic growth during the transition and democracy part of the 
sample. 
2. We found a delayed negative direct impact of military spending on education 
expenditure. In addition, a 2-year positive delay effect of growth is found statistically 
significant in explaining education spending. Therefore, both direct and indirect effects 
are found for the analyzed period.  
3. Based on these results, the impact of increasing defense spending on education 
expenditure turned out to be negative during Franco’s dictatorship period, since both 
direct and indirect effect moved in the same direction: higher military expenditure 
diminished investment and it brought down economic growth and consequently affected 
education expenditure negatively. On the contrary, for the second part of the sample, 
increasing defense expenditure turned out to increase growth in spite of the crowding 
out effect. Therefore, it would be difficult to identify the final effect on education 
spending. Probably it depended on the ability of the policy-makers to make spending 
decisions based on their implications for economic growth. It becomes clear that they 
must to take into account both the direct and indirect effect of defense spending. 
4.- Finally, it is noteworthy that according to the average economic growth generated 
during the period examined (4.83 per cent) and the average reduction on military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2.51 per cent), based on equation (6), education 
spending should have increased by 5.60 per cent, while the actual education spending 
increased by just 3.31 per cent. This could prove that Spanish governments, especially 
during Franco dictatorship, did not take full advantage of the exceptional conditions to 
increase public education spending during the analyzed period.  
VI. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we analyze the defense-economic growth-education relationship for Spain 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Previous empirical studies on the guns 
versus butter dilemma made for thirty countries, most of them in Europe, reported 
mixed results. An influential paper by Mintz and Huang (1991) found an indirect trade-
off between military outlays and education spending through declining economic 
growth via reduction of investment for the US between 1953 y 1987. Applying Mintz 
and Huang’s strategy we repeat the analysis for Spain during the period 1950- 2000. We 
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find both direct and indirect effects of military spending on education expenditures, 
neither of them being contemporary, and contrary to the Mintz and Huang analysis that 
did not find the direct effect for the US. During Franco dictatorship, both effects moved 
in the same direction, decreasing education expenditure. For the transition to 
democracy, the crowding out effect was offset by the short run positive effect generated 
by military outlays on the GDP growth. This finding supports the conclusion of Benoit, 
i.e., in the countries that were less-developed, as was Spain during the 1970s, defense 
spending had a positive effect on the performance of the economy. This result 
highlights that the final impact of military outlays on education expenditure might 
depend on policy-maker spending decisions. It is hoped that expenditure choices by 
government will be one of the many important issues of Public Finance that this article 
gives rise to in future research.
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Appendix 1.  Countries and periods studied in the literature 
 
Australia (1950-1993), Austria (1950-1993), Belgium (1950-1993), Bulgaria (1950-
1996), Canada (1947-1993), Czechoslovakia (1950-1966), Denmark (1950-1993), 
Federal Republic of German (1947-1993), Finland (1950-1993),  France (1947-1993), 
German Democratic Republic (1950-1966), Greece (1950-1966), Holland (1950-1993), 
Hungary (1950-1966), Ireland (1950-1993), Israel (1950-1968), Italy (1950-1993), 
Japan (1950-1993), Luxembourg (1960-1993), New Zealand (1950-1993), Norway 
(1950-1993), Poland (1950-1966), Romania (1950-1966), Soviet Union (1950-1966), 
Sweden (1950-1993), Switzerland (1950-1993), Turkey (1924-1996), United States of 
America (1900-1993),  Yugoslavia (1950-1966). 
 
Appendix 2. Data sources used to construct series 
 
Gross domestic product at market prices: From Carreras, Prados and Rosés (2005) 
Gross private domestic investment: Constructed with the GFCF and deflator GFCF 
figures from Prados (2003) 
Net value of capital stock: From Cubel and Palafox (2002) and Mas, Pérez and Uriel 
(2003) 
Private business output: Calculated subtracting from the GDP the government 
consumption, based on Carreras, Prados and Rosés (2005) and Prados (2003)    
Military spending: From Comín and Díaz (2005) 
Non-military spending: Constructed subtracting from the total state spending military 
expenditures, based on Comín and Diaz (2005) 
Central and regional government education expenditure: Series constructed from Comín 
and Díaz (2005) and Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas 
Government revenues: From Comín and Díaz (2005)  
School enrollment: From Núñez (2005) and Anuarios Estadísticos del Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística 
Employed civilian labor force: From Alcaide (2007), Jordana (2005) and Anuario 
Estadístico Militar, 1960-1997 and 1998-2002) 
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FIGURE 1 
Time series 
 
FIGURE 2 
Military spending/ GDP, education spending/GDP, investment/military spending and 
education spending/military spending 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics: rates of growth of the main variables. 
WHOLE 
(N=50) 
FRANCO R.
(N=25) 
AF. 
FRANCO 
(N=25) 
Mean Std.  Mean Std.   Mean Std. 
DEDU 8.37  13.47 10.40 9.56 6.17 16.69 
DY 4.84 3.21 6.52 3.40 3.15 3.15 
DI 6.39 8.45 9.47 8.71 3.30 3.30 
DP 4.82 3.64 6.78 3.81 2.86 2.86 
DM 2.09 8.35 3.64 9.93 0.54 0.54 
DNM 7.45 12.43 7.69 12.24 7.22 7.22 
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TABLE 2  
Guns versus butter
Equation 3  Equation 5  Equation 6 
D. Vrble:  
IYt 
Coefficient 
D. Vrble: 
%Yt/Yt-1 Coefficient 
D. Vrble: 
EDUYt/ EDUYt-1 Coefficient 
C -0.20*** C 1.67 C -4.35*** 
(0.03) (2.29) (1.28) 
(Pt)/Yt 
0.72*** 
%Lt/Lt-1 
0.45*** 
%Yt-2/ Yt-3 
1.02*** 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.31) 
(Pt-1)/ Yt 
0.77*** (NMt)/Yt-1 
-1.79 
%MYt/ MYt 
-0.11 
(0.09) (10.85) (0.13) 
(Pt-2)/ Yt 
0.71*** (Mt)/Yt-1 
237.32** 
%MYt-1 / MYt-2 
-0.27* 
(0.08) (107.8) (0.14) 
(Pt-3)/ Yt 
0.53*** 
It/Yt-1 
20.59** % (ENROLt-1)/ 
ENROLt-2 
0.28* 
(0.08) (8.97) (0.15) 
(Pt-4)/ Yt 
0.36*** Tt*It/Yt-1 -15.36***(3.27) I87 
64.86*** 
(0.07) R-squared 0.47 (1.27) 
(Pt-5)/Yt 
0.20* Adj. R-squared 0.41 
 
 
(0.12)  
(NMt)/Yt 
-0.23** R-squared 0.72 
(0.08) Ad. R-squared 0.68 
(NMt-1)/Yt 
-0.32***   
(0.12)   
(NMt-2)/Yt 
-0.44***   
(0.10)   
(NMt-3)/Yt 
-0.52***  
(0.12)  
TABLE 3 
Error correlation matrix 
(NMt-4)/Yt -0.31*** (0.06) 
 Eq5 Eq6 
 
Eq3 -0.23 -0.09 
(Mt)/Yt -0.56 (0.70)  
Eq5 1 0.09 
(Mt-1)/Yt -2.36** 
(1.12) 
(Mt-2)/Yt 
-3.43** 
(1.44) 
(Mt-3)/Yt 
-2.51** 
(1.10) 
Kt-1/Yt 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
φ1 0.46** (0.13) 
R-squared 0.94 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9 
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TABLE 4  
Guns versus butter (SURE estimator)
Equation 3  Equation 5  Equation 6 
D. Vrble:  
IYt 
Coefficient 
D. Vrble: 
%Yt/Yt-1 Coefficient 
D. Vrble: 
EDUYt/ EDUYt-1 Coefficient 
C 
-0.11*** 
C 
1.42 
C 
-4.37** 
(0.02) (1.87) (1.75) 
(Pt)/Yt 
0.53*** 
%Lt/Lt-1 
0.53*** 
%Yt-2/ Yt-3 
1.02*** 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.30) 
(Pt-1)/ Yt 
0.38*** (NMt)/Yt-1 
-1.21 
%MYt/ MYt-1 
-0.12 
(0.08) (13.94) (0.13) 
(Pt-2)/ Yt 
0.37*** (Mt)/Yt-1 
242.29* 
%MYt/ MYt-1 
-0.26** 
(0.08) (131.9) (0.13) 
(Pt-3)/ Yt 
0.24*** 
It/Yt-1 
21.51*** % (ENROLt-1)/ 
ENROLt-2 
0.27 
(0.07) (8.75) (0.17) 
(Pt-4)/ Yt 
0.14* Tt*It/Yt-1 
-15.34**
(3.09)
I87 
65.00*** 
(0.08) R-squared 0.46 (6.56) 
(Pt-5)/Yt 
0.11* 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.41 
 
 
(0.08)  
(NMt)/Yt 
-0.11* R-squared 0.72 
(0.06) Ad. R-squared 0.68 
(NMt-1)/Yt -0.08   
(0.07)   
(NMt-2)/Yt -0.13   
(0.08)   
(NMt-3)/Yt -0.19** 
(0.09) 
(NMt-4)/Yt 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
(Mt)/Yt -0.42 
(0.59) 
(Mt-1)/Yt 
-1.84** 
(0.73) 
(Mt-2)/Yt 
-1.61** 
(0.76) 
(Mt-3)/Yt 
-1.31* 
(0.70) 
Kt-1/Yt 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
φ1 0.53** 
(0.02) 
R-squared 0.95 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 
 
